CONTACT REPORTS OF CAPTAIN PULLER

EXTRACTS FROM GN NEWS LETTER #120
HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA

3 October 1932.

From: Commanding Officer, Company "M"
To The Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.
Via: The Area Commander. Central Area.

Subject: Report of engagements with bandit groups at:

(1) RIO AUYABAL (295-375) 1030 26 Sept 1932.
(2) LINDO LUGARE (291-379) 1130 26 Sept 1932.
(3) SAN ANTONIO (362-329) 0370 30 Sept 1932.
(4) LA CEIBA (249-326) 1300 30 Sept 1932.

1. The following officers and men took part in the four engagements listed above with bandit groups at the time and places shown:

Captain Lewis B. Puller, G.N.
1st Lieut. William A. Lee, G.N.
40 enlisted men.

NOTE: Raso Alberto Nicaragua ,#1224 was killed in the second engagement and Raso Juan A. Altamirano #4998 died on the morning of 27 September from a wound received in the second engagement.

2. On this patrol from 20 September to 1 October, my plans approved by the Area Commander, were to locate and destroy large permanent camps of the bandit leaders, SANDINO and ALTAMIRANO, that I believed to be located east of the RIO COCO and between the RIO CUA and the RIO WAMBLAN. The company had nineteen mules with it and carried thirty days rations. When SANDINO went north from SARAGUASCA (337-327) in 1930, he established his camp in the MALAGA TE MOUNTAIN (367-345), and from here he went further north and established his camp on the RIO CUA (279-367), later on he moved still further north. I believe that he now has three camps, one between the RIO CUA and the KILANDE Mountain (285-374), one east of QUILALI (272-279), and the other east of POTECA, (276-405). Since returning to Nicaragua last July, I have heard rumors of a large open road running north eastward of PENA BLANCA (284-328) and extending from the East Coast of Nicaragua to the border of Honduras. During the few days that I served as District Commander of CORINTO FINCA during July and August, I learned that the bandits were driving cattle northward around both ends of PENA BLANCA. I decided to go east from PAVONA (379- 333) and cut a trail until 1 ran into the road that I believed to exist; within three miles of PAVONA this road was located. It is just about the same road that is shown on the map; from PAVONA, it runs eastward through the CHACHAGON PASS (284-331) and then northward. An open trail from the east joins this road about one days march north from the CHACHAGON PASS and another open trail runs south westward from CARROBO (301-370). These are more than trails, they are almost roads; it is hard to believe that they exist. Hundreds of head of cattle, pack animals, and men have been using these roads.

3. In planning this patrol, I had hopes that the company ould be able to get into the territory without being observed by he bandits as we did in the PANTASMA VALLEY and the JICALITA mountain in August. From the moment that the company crossed the CHAGON PASS, we were picked up by two (2) bandit scouts who kept just ahead of us for a day and half and then pushed on ahead up the road. Twenty-four (24) temporary deserted bandit camps were passed all of which had been used in the last three months. From the time we were picked up, I knew that we would be ambushed at any moment; it was not practicable for me to employ flankers all the time if I wished to get anywhere. My only course was to push ahead and cover as much distance as practicable.

4. (1) RIO AUY ABAL (295-375), 1030 26 Sept 1932. The company was ambushed by a small group of bandits who employed rifle fire only. There were no Guardia casualties. There were noknownbandit casualties. The bandits fired one volley and fled to thenorth westward. From what Lieutenant Lee told me and what I know, I believe this was an effort to get the officers of the company. The Guardias did not hesitate a second when the line went forward to the bandit position.

5. (2) LINDO LUGAR (291-379) 1130, 26 Sept 1932.

The company was ambushed by a large group over, one hundred and fifty (150) bandits here, who employed seven (7) or more automatic weapons, rifle grenades, hand grenades, between one hundred fifty (150) and two hundred (200) dynamite bombs, and a great quantity of rifle ammunition. When I say one hundred and fifty bandits and seven automatic weapons, it is a conservative statement; the Guardias estimate is much larger. I know that they employed on (1) Lewis Machine Gun, three (3) Browning Automatic Rifles, and from three (3) to six (6) Thompson sub-machine guns. After the fight the guardias picked up empty cartridge cases by the hats full; a hat and a half of Springfield ammunition was also picked up. The noise of their dynamite bombs drowned our fire out. Raso Alberto Nicaragua #1224 was killed by a burst of automatic fire and was buried a short distance from the scene of the engagement (grave concealed). Raso Juan A. Altimirano, #4998, was shot through the head, died on the morning of 27 September and buried near (295-355), (grave concealed); he never regained consciousness. Lieutenant William A. Lee was shot through the right arm and in the head; he was knocked unsconcious and thought to be dead. Raso F ernando Dorman #3545 was wounded in the head and left-hand by a hand grenade or bomb fragments. Raso Felipe Salgado #3465 was wounded in the left leg by rifle or machine gun fire. Ten (10) bandits were killed and six (6) known wounded; during the fight when a bandit was hit you could hear the machete men being called up to drag them off. The machete platoons were also being urged to charge the company during the entire fight. The bandit casualties were heavier than is being re ported. This group was under an experienced leader and they had plenty of fight in them. SANDINO was somewhere in the vicinity as was evidenced by the constant vivas for him; also PEDRON ALTAMIRANO. The bandits took advantage of a natural "V" position which was seemingly made to order. This engagement lasted thirty (30) minutes. Lieutenant Lee after being unconscious for fifteen or twenty minutes, took over the Lewis machine gun and used it with telling effect; his six days of marching back to JINOTEGA was no joy ride. In the days of the wooden ships he would have been an iron man. The company cleared the bandits from their position, went forward to a ridge that crossed the road, established outposts, took care of the wounded, and buried Raso Nicaragua. Here due to my wounded, I was forced to begin my return to JINOTEGA. The terrain at the scene of this engagement is broken and covered with heavy forest and brush.

6. (3) SAN ANTONIO (362-239) 0730,30 Sept 1932.

The company was ambushed here by a group of eighty (80) or more bandits who employed two (2) automatic weapons, rifles, and many dynamite bombs. There was no shortage of bandit rifle ammunition. Before the bandits opened a heavy fire, one shot was fired and the company at once took advantage of available cover. There were no guardia casualties. One bandit was killed and seven or more wounded. Here again the machete men were called when a bandit was hit. The company went forward and drove the bandits through the woods. The bandits split in two main groups; one went south and the other southwest. The spirit of the company was excellent in this contact after expecting to be ambushed every foot of the trail for the past five days. Again Lieutenant Lee put the Lewis machine gun in action and set a splendid example for the company.

7. (4) LA CEIBA (249-326) 1300, 30 Sept 1932.

The company was ambushed here by a group of forty (40) or more bandits who employed two automatic weapons, rifles, and dynamite bombs. The trail here runs along a stream, crosses the stream, and enters thick brush and trees on the other side: On the near side of the stream is a bluff from twenty to thirty feet in height. The bandit position was along this bluff and to the south of the trail on the other side. The bandits opened fire one at a time and most of the company was under cover. There were no guardia casualties. Three or more bandits were killed or wounded in this engagement. Again the spirit of Lieutenant Lee and the men was excellent. The bandits were driven from their position and scattered in all directions.

8. I was strongly advised against making this patrol with a small number of guardias and was told that SANDINO could concentrate more than five hundred (500) well armed bandits to employ against the company.

9. Lieutenant Lee has been in twenty (20) some engagements against bandits while serving under me and has distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism a number of times in the line of his profession: I recommend him for the Cruz de Valor.

/s/ L. B. PULLER.