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Early American Intervention
1910 ~ 1912




Determined to crush once and for all the menace of an aggressive dictatorship in Central America, Knox and Taft decided to intervene. Estrada, badly beaten, had fallen back upon Bluefields to re-equip his troops and to obtain reinforcements. The government countered by buying a steamship, mounting guns on her, and using her to blockade Bluefields. When the vessel moved into position to bombard that city, the United States showed its hand.

As early as February 1910, Marine units and Navy vessels had begun to concentrate in Nicaraguan waters. On the western coast, a regiment led by Colonel James E. Mahoney was aboard the BUFFALO off Corinto; but the area of operation shifted rapidly to the opposite coast, and in March, the unit returned to Panama. The task of halting the fighting around Bluefields fell to the seamen and Marines of the DUBUQUE and PADUCAH. On May 19, landing parties from both ships went ashore to guard American property and to establish what came to be called in later revolutions a "neutral zone." Once the situation ashore had been stabilized, the vessels took turns shuttling reinforcements to Bluefields. While one prevented any attempt at bombardment or blockade, the other would steam to Panama to load elements of a Marine battalion commanded by Major Smedley D. Butler, a hero of the Boxer Rebellion.

The forces of President Madriz were stopped cold in their tracks. Their converted freighter could not hope to stand up to the guns of American cruisers nor could their poorly disciplined army be expected to make any headway against Butler's men. Worse than the military impasse was the fact that Estrada had been allowed to take over the Bluefields customs office, thus cutting off the government from one of its prime sources of income. Faced with this dilemma, the Liberals fell to quarrelling among themselves, their troops began deserting, and the regime crumbled like a castle of sand. Estrada marched triumphantly into Managua to try his hand at running the country. Most of the Liberals were pardoned, but Zelaya accepted an offer of asylum in Mexico.<17>

On 4 September 1910, Butler's battalion sailed for Panama, its mission accomplished. Estrada was holding the reins of government, the American property in Bluefields was intact; but, for the State Department, the task was just beginning. European creditors were demanding payment on the loans negotiated by Zelaya.

Secretary Knox sent Thomas C. Dawson to assist the Nicaraguans in overhauling the nation's finances. Estrada promised to revoke the concessions granted by Zelaya and to call a constitutional convention which would draft a more stable form of government.

Secretary Knox moved quickly to negotiate a treaty with Nicaragua. The document was to give American bankers the protection they demanded before making any substantial loan to the Estrada government. The bankers requested, and Estrada agreed, that the United States should have control over the collection of Nicaraguan customs duties and that the money derived from customs should be used to repay the loan.

The treaty then went before the Senate of the United States, and while it was being debated, two American banking firms made some $15 million available to the Estrada government at 5 percent interest. Then, to the surprise of everyone, the Senate rejected Knox's treaty. The bankers did their best to insure that their money would not end up in the pockets of Nicaraguan cabinet members. To handle the stabilization of the country's currency, they set up a National Bank of Nicaragua in which they retained a controlling interest. These investors also advanced enough money to defray the operating expenses of the national government in return for stock in Nicaragua's National Railway. Last, they got permission to appoint the collector of customs.

In spite of the sudden influx of capital and the improved handling of revenue, Estrada soon found himself in the usual financial difficulty. He tried too hard to redress the wrongs of his predecessor. Conservatives, whose property had been confiscated by Zelaya, demanded some sort of settlement. It was the payment of these claims which set the government tottering on the brink of bankruptcy.

Another difficulty dogging Estrada was the fact that as a recent convert from Liberalism he was not the real leader of the Conservative party. At the head of the "machine" was Emiliano Chamorro, an aristocrat, who kept a close watch over the President's actions. The presence within the official family of an unrepentant Liberal, Jose Maria Moncada, and a headstrong Conservative, Luis Mena, made it even harder for the President to adopt any consistent domestic policy.

Estrada, nevertheless, might have weathered the storm had it not been for the loans. This issue proved a rallying point for the Liberal opposition who claimed that the Conservatives had sold out to the United States. To have a foreigner in charge of Nicaragua's finances was doubly galling, for besides halting political graft, it wounded the national pride. Not only were the Liberal politicians aroused, the peasants themselves were angered by this affront to their homeland. The loan, then, marked a change in Nicaraguan political life. Those religious conflicts which had brought about the forming of the rival parties had long ago been forgotten. Civic pride was dying. >From now on, subservience to the United States would be the major issue, with the Liberals being militantly anti-American while the Conservatives depended upon the support of the United States to remain in power.

In the autumn of 1911, the constitutional convention set up by the Dawson Agreement had pledged itself to retain Estrada for another term, but it suddenly changed its mind and reported out a constitution which would have stripped the chief executive of most of his powers. Estrada immediately dissolved the convention; but Luis Mena, in the meantime had pressured the National Assembly into electing him president. Mena promptly was jailed, but a band of officers gathered in Managua to release their leader. Fortunately, the American Minister was able to restrain the rebels long enough for Estrada to resign. With the army under his thumb, Mena was in control. He declined, however, to take office until his elected term should begin; so Adolfo Diaz succeeded Estrada.<18>

During the spring and summer of 1912, Nicaragua seemed headed for anarchy. The great issue of the day was the acceptance of the loan and the subsequent surrender of control of the nation's customs. The Liberals were violently anti-American, while Mena's followers, most of them Conservatives, resented Diaz's negotiations with the United States. What followed was a three-cornered battle, with Diaz trying to maintain the old order, Mena struggling to control Diaz, and the Liberals, under Benjamin Zeledon, trying to destroy both Conservative factions. Hostilities began on the last day of May, when the Liberals blew up Loma Fort at Managua. Some 60 people were killed in this blast, which was followed in a few days by the destruction of a powder magazine in the same city.

To Diaz, control of his own party seemed more important than suppressing the Liberal revolt. Apparently, he felt that once he had rid himself of Mena, the United States would be induced to support him. On 29 July 1912, he replaced Mena with Emiliano Chamorro. The ousted cabinet member fled to Masaya site of a federal arsenal. There, his son, commander of the army barracks at Granada, joined him with troops. Since Mena was opposed to the loan, a great many Liberals flocked to his standard; but his distrust of that party and of Benjamin Zeledon, its leader, prevented the forming of a united front.




NEXT: A Major American Intervention, 1912 ~ 1926




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