~ ~ ~ ~ ~
A Major American Intervention
1912 ~ 1926
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After urging Americans to invest in Nicaragua, the United States
government could not stand idly by and see their properties destroyed. The
American Minister demanded that Diaz guarantee effective protection of
American citizens and property. Diaz replied that he was powerless to give
such an assurance and requested American intervention. <19>
The first detachment of the American forces that President Diaz had
requested was a handful of seamen from the USS ANNAPOLIS who arrived at
Managua from Corinto on 4 August. Although the presence of a few Bluejackets
might be sufficient to dampen the ardor of the rebels at Managua, a much
larger force--probably several battalions of infantry--would be needed to
protect American interests throughout the country. Such an expedition would
need bases of supply; so for this reason, as well as to deny the port to the
rebels, Bluefields was occupied. The USS TACOMA landed 19 Marines and twice
as many seamen there on 17 August.
The spearhead of the expeditionary force was to be once again Major
Butler's battalion, consisting of 13 officers and 341 men. The JUSTIN,
carrying the battalion and its equipment, arrived at Corinto on 14 August and
anchored near the Annapolis. The Marines immediately went ashore. Thus,
within two weeks, American forces had gained a foothold on both coasts and
assembled a fairly powerful infantry unit ready to strike eastward toward
Managua and the interior.<20>
The first task confronting Butler was the relief of the Managua legation.
He decided to bull his way into the city and then, once his position was
secure, begin the formal palaver which might bring peace. Three companies of
Marines and 80 seamen scrambled aboard two trains to begin the 90-mile haul
from Corinto to the capital. On the following day, 15 August, Butler and his
men pulled into Managua.
With Managua secure from attack for the time being, Butler decided to
make his peace overtures to General Mena. The American Minister and the
Marine major pooled their talents to draw up a message urging Mena to yield
honorably. The rebel general was known to be somewhere in the vicinity of
Masaya with a large number of troops. First Lieutenant Edward H. Conger,
Private Carl W. Aviszus, and Private Charles T. Kline volunteered to deliver
the note. On 16 August, the trio struck out. Returning to the legation,
Conger reported that General Mena, ill with rheumatism, would be only too
happy to surrender but that he no longer commanded rebel forces. Benjamin
Zeledon, formerly Minister of War in the Zelaya cabinet and a die-hard
Liberal, had succeeded him.<21>
In the meantime, reinforcements were arriving at Corinto, so Butler
decided to make contact with them to tell them of these latest developments.
Commander Warren J. Terhune, Marine Captain Nelson P. Vulte, 10 Marines, and
40 seamen boarded a train at Managua on 20 August and rattled off toward
Corinto. Near Leon, the locomotive came grinding to a halt before a crude
road block. Neither Terhune nor Vulte was willing to risk an attack against a
force of undetermined size in the gathering dusk. Their decision to pull back
some three miles and wait for dawn was a wise one.
The night was quiet. On the following morning, the seamen removed the
block, and the train crept forward until it was halted by a rebel patrol. The
Nicaraguans held their fire and merely requested that the Americans hold a
conference with their commander. Vulte obtained permission to pass
unchallenged through rebel lines.
Confident that he had won a diplomatic victory, Vulte returned to the
train and reported to Commander Terhune. Outguards slung their rifles and
scrambled aboard as the locomotive began to gather momentum. Leon loomed
ahead as the Americans rolled onward, but suddenly, a mob of armed rebels
appeared astride the rails and fanned out to surround Terhune's command. Its
leaders decided to free the seamen and Marines but hold the train, and the
Americans began the long trek back to Managua.<22>
The capture of the train was no laughing matter. In itself, the failure
to break through was of little consequence, but the affair added immeasurably
to the prestige of the rebels. Butler could have awaited reinforcements
behind the fortifications at Managua--this was the course of action urged upon
him by the American Minister; but he was a man impatient by nature. He
decided to divide his forces and, with about 190 men, open up the railway from
Managua to Corinto.
Butler with Commander Terhune, and Marine Lieutenants Alexander
Vandegrift, Edward Ostermann, and Richard Tebbs loaded the men on two trains
and on 25 August started toward the coast.<23>
Unlike the Terhune expedition, Butler's trains ran into difficulties from
the outset. Weakened culverts and torn up rails slowed the progress of the
column, but there was no serious opposition until the lead train approached a
trestle on the outskirts of Leon. A band of rebel irregulars halted the
Americans. Made bold by the previous success, the "commandante" shouldered
his way up to Butler and began a long tirade designed to reduce the major to a
cowering hulk. When this approach failed, the rebel drew his revolver; but
Butler struck like a cat, snatching up the weapon and ceremoniously unloading
it. The mob dissolved in a roar of laughter, and the Americans, with the
chastened commander as their prisoner, rolled on into Leon.
The citizens of Leon were in as violent a mood as they had been when they
captured the first train. Butler's caravan was slowed to a walk as the
locomotives clanked past the ominous crowds. A powerful woman threaded her
way through the mob and ran toward the engine cab where the slender Butler was
seated. Reaching up, she began honing her machete on Butler's leggings, all
the while screaming that she would bury the blade in the major's skull.
Instead of firing the shot which might have triggered a massacre, he reached
down and chucked her under the chin. Forgetting her plans for homicide in her
embarrassment, she turned and fled.
The comparatively short trip from Leon to Corinto passed without
incident. Butler informed the American Naval officers at Corinto of Zeledon's
rise and Mena's illness. All that remained was to return to Managua. Again,
the trains were halted by torn-up rails and damaged bridges, but there was no
armed interference.<24>
Upon his return to Managua, Major Butler found the situation little
changed. Government troops still manned the city's defenses, and the threat
of an all-out assault by the rebels had vanished.<25>
Two additional Marine units the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st
Provisional Regiment, arrived at Corinto on September, along with the
regimental commander, Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton. Within two days, this
force had completed its movement by rail to Managua, freeing Butler's
battalion for operations elsewhere along the railroad right of way.<26>
The first mission which Pendleton assigned Butler was to clear the
railway from the capital through Masaya southeast to Granada, and on 15
September, he entrained with his battalion for Granada. His was a formidable
task force. Three companies with a pair of machine guns and two three-inch
field pieces were crammed aboard the train. Two locomotives, separated by box
cars and placed near the roar of the train, propelled a strange collection of
rolling-stock, ranging from flat cars for the supporting weapons to a
passenger coach. Aside from the groans of the steam engines, there was no
cause for worry until the train approached La Barranca, a hill near Masaya,
where government troops were besieging General Zeledon's Liberals.<27>
Halting the train well out of range of Liberal batteries, Butler
commandeered a handcar and pumped back to within federal lines, only to learn,
that instead of a quiet siege, his men had wandered into the midst of a
pitched battle. Butler and a Spanish-speaking officer strode forward under a
flag of truce to talk with Zeledon.
Butler arranged for a conference between one of Zeledon's officers and
Colonel Pendleton; but this was not enough, for the rebel commander in chief
insisted upon talking with the ranking American naval officer as well.
After several days of conferences between Zeledon and Rear Admiral
William H. H. Southerland, in the afternoon of 19 September a messenger
arrived, telling the Marines that Zeledon had agreed to allow the trains to
pass through his lines. At 2010, they pushed off into the deepening gloom,
their rifles ready and with over a dozen machine guns scattered along the
length of the train.
Rumbling through Masaya, the train had slowed for a cross street, when a
man mounted on a horse galloped toward the locomotive. He swept up to the
cab, pulled a pistol, and fired at Major Butler. The bullet struck a Marine
corporal in the finger. Butler halted the train to allow a surgeon to
administer first aid. Immediately, rebel snipers stationed on rooftops opened
fire. The Marines began blazing away, many of them dropping from the cars and
taking cover beside the roadbed. Butler sent the train hurtling along the
rails. A handful of the men firing from beside the train was left behind; but
Captain Vulte collected them, loaded them on a handcar, and took out after the
rapidly disappearing boxcars.
A mile or so beyond Masaya, Vulte caught up to the train. Butler had
stopped to take a head count and was seething with rage. Five of his men had
been wounded, while three still were missing. At this moment, four envoys
arrived with a letter of apology from Zeledon. Butler demanded that his three
Marines be returned immediately, or he would attack Masaya in the morning.
Within the hour, the men were returned, one of them slightly wounded.<28>
Safely past Zeledon's Liberals, Butler had to contend with General Mena's
rebels at Granada. Great sections of track had been ripped up, progress was
slow, and Butler was in an impatient mood by the time he met Mena's
delegation. The village of San Blas, near Granada, had been chosen by Butler
as the site of the meeting. Butler threatened to attack Granada unless Mena
signed a letter of surrender. <29>
Mena stalled as long as he could. At 0145 on the morning of 22
September, Butler rounded up his officers to outline his plan of attack, a
thrust directly along the tracks into Granada. Just as the point was starting
down the rails, Mena's letter of surrender arrived.<30>
Later that day, Pendleton and a trainload of rations and medicine arrived
at Granada, and Mena was allowed to go peacefully into exile. Save for
Zeledon's bastion on the Barranca-Coyotope hill mass, the entire railroad
system was free from rebel interference. With Mena out of the picture,
Pendleton was able to concentrate against Zeledon.
On 2 October, the Marines arrived within federal lines. During the
following day, Marine artillery joined government cannoneers in shelling
Liberal positions. In the evening, Butler was ordered to move his battalion
into position to attack the southeastern slopes of Coyotope in cooperation
with federal troops.
The fight was brief. At 0515, Butler's men coined the others in storming
up the slope against a heavy volume of inaccurate fire. In 40 minutes, the
battle had ended. Nine rebels were captured, 27 killed, and the rest put to
flight. General Zeledon was killed by Liberal soldiers when he attempted to
desert them. Seven American seamen and Marines were killed at Coyotope.
The town of Masaya fell to government troops who enjoyed a carnival of
killing 41 and looting, but Leon wisely surrendered to an American officer.
The revolution suppressed, the Marine regiment was withdrawn; but a force of
Leathernecks remained on duty at the Managua legation.<31>
What were the results of the American intervention? First of all, the
Conservatives retained their precarious hold on the Presidency, but their
power rested on the presence of a strong Marine detachment at the Managua
legation. In addition, American diplomats managed to forestall a split in
Conservative ranks. Both Diaz and General Chamorro wanted to be President for
the 1913-1917 term; but the American Minister managed to convince the general
to accept appointment as Nicaraguan Minister to the United States. Since the Diaz ticket was the only one placed
before the electorate--a mere three or four thousand citizens were allowed to
vote--the Conservatives were unanimously elected.<32>
The most important accomplishment, of course, was the bringing of peace
to Nicaragua. Respite from war offered the nation a chance to raise the
standards of living of its people, and pay its debts--in short to fulfill the
altruistic purposes of Dollar Diplomacy. American investments were protected
by Marines during the revolt, and afterward by the Diaz government. Last, but
far from least, the United States had intervened with enough vigor to prove
once again that no European encroachment in Central America would be
tolerated.
Woodrow Wilson, inaugurated President of the United States in March 1913,
selected William Jennings Bryan as his Secretary of State. Bryan resurrected
the Knox treaty, inserted a clause giving the United States the right to
intervene with armed forces, obtained the signature of General Chamorro, and
submitted the draft to the United States Senate. Signed in August 1914, the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty languished in the Senate until February 1916. Not until
the clause added by Bryan had been removed would the American legislators
ratify the agreement. Nicaragua quickly ratified.<33>
Like the intervention of 1912, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty became a vital
issue in Nicaraguan politics. Diaz had survived in power thanks to the work
of American Marines. The fact that the United States now had obtained leases
on the canal route and upon valuable sites for naval bases looked to many
Nicaraguans as though the United States was taking advantage of Diaz. The
financial reforms would work to benefit all Nicaragua; but the fact remained
that they worked slowly, and the average Nicaraguan could see only that
foreigners were dictating his nation's fiscal policy. The Liberals, of
course, pointed to the Marine detachment at Managua and shouted that Diaz was
a mere puppet of the United States. They circulated all sorts of rumors about
American designs upon the country; and, since few had the means of checking
their accuracy, the Liberals won a great many converts to anti-Americanism.
<34>
Nicaragua was preparing for the 1916 presidential election. By this
time, the Conservatives finally had split, with Diaz claiming the loyalty of
his circle of office holders, while the rank and file rallied behind Emiliano
Chamorro. Diaz put forward Carlos Cuadras Paso as his candidate, but the
majority of the Conservatives were for Chamorro. The third candidate was the
choice of the Liberals, Julian Irias, formerly an advisor to Zelaya. The
nomination of Irias placed the United States in an embarrassing position.
Since there were more Liberals than Conservatives in the country, an honest
election would have brought into power a man who had been associated with one
of the most corrupt and warlike regimes ever to hold power over Nicaragua. On
the other hand, if the United States allowed Diaz to supervise the voting,
Cuadras would win, and the Liberals might unite with a majority of
Conservatives against him. The problem lay in preventing the election of
Irias, a man dedicated to freeing Nicaragua from American control, while
avoiding a situation which might result in rebellion. The solution was
complex. The Diaz government prevented the exiled Irias from returning to
campaign, while the United States made it clear to the Liberals that no
President ever associated with Zelaya would be recognized as lawful ruler.
Next, Cuadras was persuaded to withdraw; and in October, Chamorro won in a
landslide.<35>
Being President of Nicaragua easily becomes a habit. Once in power, a
chief executive seldom stepped down willingly. Chamorro, however, was an
exception to this rule. After four years in the executive mansion, he
selected an uncle to succeed him. In 1920, Diego Chamorro stood for election
on the Conservative ticket, and 90,000 Nicaraguans cast votes in the turbulent
canvass. On that number, Diego Chamorro received some 58,000, a safe
plurality.
After the votes had been counted, Emiliano Chamorro agreed to a revision
of the electoral law, then stood aside as his uncle took the oath of office.
Harold W. Dodds, an American political scientist, was given the thankless task
of devising honest electoral machinery for the republic. His plan, completed
in 1922, was submitted to the Nicaraguan congress, where it met the bitter
opposition of the Conservatives. The Liberals, who felt that an honest
election would insure their victory, supported the measure. Not until the
American Minister had reminded President Chamorro that his nephew had
virtually promised the passage of such a law did the Conservatives come into
line.<36>
The new electoral law was first tested in 1924. It was the most nearly
honest election ever held in the republic. Proof of this lay in the fact that
a coalition government was placed in office; Conservative Carlos Solarzano
became President and Liberal Juan Sacasa Vice-President.<37>
And what of the Marines during this era of electoral reform? During the
presidency of Diego Chamorro, the men of the Legation Guard were treated as
hated symbols of American imperialism. The most difficult problem facing the
Marines was the trying task of getting along with the Nicaraguans. Little had
been done to ease the lot of the Leathernecks. Morale officers tried, but
they had neither the time nor the equipment to organize an all-round athletic
program. The most popular form of recreation was drinking, and this sport was
pursued in the dingy cantinas of the city, where there always were women to
fight over. As far as the local police were concerned, a drunken or
disorderly Marine was fair game.
The series of clashes between Marines and police came to a head on the
night of 8 December 1921, when a private shot and killed a policeman. As a
result of this incident, a systematic town patrol was begun and every effort
was made to raise the morale and standards of conduct of the command.<38>
While these reforms were taking place, the guard was reinforced to head off
any Liberal-inspired rioting. Early in January 1922, a group of 30 Marines
arrived from the USS GALVESTON. A little later, 52 men arrived from the
DENVER, while the NITRO contributed 45 Leathernecks. After a few weeks, the
majority of the reinforcements were withdrawn.<39>
The bringing in of reinforcements was justified, for the flames of hate
were raging throughout Nicaragua. Diego Chamorro was flayed in the newspapers
for permitting the Americans to land additional Marines, but the frenzy for
war soon passed. Of more lasting importance was the fact that Mexican
propagandists seized upon the incident to claim a contrast between "the
benevolence of their nation" and "American barbarity." For the first time, a
bond between the Nicaraguan Liberals and the Mexican government began to
emerge.<40>
In May, the long awaited Liberal revolt took place. Loma fort was
seized, but the Legation Guard was sufficiently strong to prevent fighting in
Managua. Government troops easily suppressed the uprising.<41> By this time,
Liberal sentiment was beginning to be swayed by the hope of electoral reform.
A calm settled over the country, a peace that remained unbroken even when
President Chamorro died in office. The Vice President was known to have
ambitions to succeed himself in office; and the Liberals, relying on the
American promise of fair elections, pointed out to the United States that this
would be illegal. The State Department informed them that no government which
seized power in defiance of the constitution would be recognized. Satisfied,
the Liberals turned their energies to winning the next election.<42>
From the fevered heights of early 1922, the hatred felt by the Liberals
toward the Marines gradually cooled, until by election time, the Leathernecks
were regarded with some esteem. A few Marines assisted Dr. Dodds in observing
registration for the 1924 canvass; and when it was proposed that Marines
supervise the actual electoral count, the Conservatives and not the Liberals
complained.<43> The absence of observers at this critical time probably
accounts for the fact that the Liberals were unable to win the Presidency
along with the Vice Presidency.
Upon taking office, President Carlos Solorzano vowed that his
administration would be the most scrupulously honest in the history of the
republic. He praised the efforts of the United States to bolster the
Nicaraguan economy and stressed the fact that sound fiscal practices would
insure the continued American cooperation. The notion of peaceful cooperation
was borne out by the decision to withdraw the Legation Guard from Managua.
Long before the election, notice had been given that the force would be
withdrawn on 1 January 1925. Because his was a coalition government, by
nature unstable, President Solorzano obtained postponement until 4 August.
During the interim, the Marines were to train an efficient constabulary to
maintain order in Nicaragua. In spite of its alleged eagerness for the
creation of a national police force, the new government took no action to
organize the constabulary until shortly before the Marines sailed.<44>
The departure of the Legation Guard was the product of a slow evolution
in American foreign policy. As early as 1913, Woodrow Wilson had hailed the
emancipation of the Central American states from foreign domination. He had
hoped to deal with these nations as equals, but the strategic importance of
Nicaragua forced him to keep a close eye on the nation's domestic affairs.
Victory over Germany and the assurance of continued friendship with Great
Britain ended the danger of European encroachment. As far as the bankers were
concerned, investments in Europe became more important than Central American
holdings. Finally, the American people were becoming more interested in
purely domestic issues, such as prohibition, than in the vigorous enforcement
of the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, President Calvin Coolidge followed Wilson's
lead by urging honest elections in Nicaragua rather than the election of a
government amenable to the United States. Removal of the Legation Guard
signalled the beginning of an attempt to deal with Nicaragua as a sovereign
power through diplomatic channels; but the attempt was soon to fail.
Approximately three weeks after the last of the Marines had left
Nicaragua, a group of Liberal cabinet members sat down to a banquet in Managua
to the sound of popping champagne corks. A band of Conservatives burst into
the room, accused them of treason, and had the lot of them thrown into jail.
The final blow fell on 25 October 1925, when the followers of the
ultra-Conservative Emiliano Chamorro seized the fortifications on La Loma.
President Solorzano and Vice President Sacasa prudently left the country.
Purged of its Liberal members, the Nicaraguan congress was reorganized; and on
16 January 1926, Chamorro took over as President.<45>
The United States, Mexico, and the other Central American republics were
shocked by Chamorro's boldness. The United States not only refused to
recognize the revolutionary government but also tried to persuade Chamorro to
resign. Thanks to the elaborate controls established over the collection of
customs by the Americans, these revenues automatically went to the central
government no matter who was President. Although his rise to power was
clearly unconstitutional, the new dictator had carefully preserved the
financial machinery of the republic. Thus, he was assured of a steady source
of revenue. For the time being at least, he could afford to ignore the
protests of the United States.
Although rioting began to sweep Nicaragua, President Chamorro did not
lose his poise. He felt that, if worse came to worse, the United States would
support the Conservatives as it had done before. In May 1926, the American
cruiser Cleveland dropped anchor at Bluefields; but no aid to the
Conservatives was forthcoming, for the seamen and Marines who went ashore were
interested only in protecting American property. Another blow to the Chamorro
government was the fact that the United States accorded the exiled Sacasa all
the honors due the Vice President of a friendly state.
Still another threat to Chamorro's peace of mind was the desire of the
Mexican government to supplant the United States as the protector of all
Central America. Since the Liberals were thought to be the party of
Nicaraguan nationalism, Mexico began providing them with arms and ammunition.
<46>
In eastern Nicaragua, a Liberal army led by General Jose Moncada was
forcing the Conservatives back upon Bluefields. Although both sides had so
far tried scrupulously to avoid endangering the lives of foreigners, a battle
at Bluefields was certain to claim many innocent victims. To insure the
neutrality of the town, the cruiser GALVESTON anchored there on 27 August
1926, and landed over a hundred seamen and Marines.<47>
Conservatives at Bluefields hailed the landing as a deliverance from
their enemies, but joy turned to disappointment when the Americans refused to
take sides in the revolution. Instead of jumping to the defense of the
Chamorro regime, the Marines marched into camp on the outskirts of town, while
the seamen set up cots in the local Moravian mission. First of all, the
landing force was to prevent the warring armies from fighting in Bluefields,
and second, it was to prevent rioting within the town.
In the meantime, the Liberals and Conservatives were at each other's
throats. For two weeks, the Liberals had hurled massed infantry attacks at the
Conservative positions atop El Bluff but had accomplished nothing. When it
became apparent that the bloody impasse could not be ended, the Americans, on
24 September, extended the neutral zone across the bay to El Bluff, forcing
the armies to march off to Rama to resume the war.<48>
In spite of the failure at El Bluff, Liberal arms were doing quite well.
Although they had not been able to crush their Conservative adversaries, the
Liberals had prolonged the war until commerce had become disrupted. This, of
course, cut off revenues at their source, so that Chamorro was becoming hard
pressed to finance his war. The United States arranged for a 30-day truce
beginning 1 October and invited both sides to send delegates to a peace
conference at Corinto. While armed Marines enforced a neutral zone around the
city, discussions were held from 16 to 24 October aboard the cruiser DENVER.
The American objective was to find an impartial person to head an interim
government. Although Sacasa did not feel that it was safe for him to attend,
he sent representatives to suggest candidates for the post of provisional
President. Unfortunately, neither side trusted the other. No one man could
be found acceptable to both parties, and the conference adjourned with nothing
accomplished.
On 30 October 1926, the day the truce expired, President Chamorro
announced his resignation. The Conservative congress chose Senator Sebastian
Uriza as his successor, but again the United States withheld diplomatic
recognition from the new government. Thoroughly weary of a war that promised
to be the bloodiest in Nicaragua's history, congress reconvened, reinstated
the Liberal members expelled by Chamorro, and chose Adolfo Diaz, Chief
Executive during the intervention of 1912, to serve as President until the
1928 election.
The interim government headed by Diaz was constitutional. Apparently a
genuine attempt had been made to reconstitute the congress as it had been
before the Chamorro coup. Also, Nicaraguan law allowed the senate to elect
one of its members to the presidency in the event that both the President and
his Vice President were residing outside the country. At this time, Solorzano
was ensconced in California; while Sacasa was protesting from Guatemala that
he would not survive for long should he return to Managua. Since the
government was legitimate, the United States extended almost immediate
recognition.
Although the United States was prompt to recognize the Diaz government, a
move endorsed by most European powers, Mexico insisted that Sacasa was the
rightful ruler of Nicaragua even though he was absent from the country.<49>
Diaz failed to end the revolution. Neither the promise of a high
diplomatic post for himself nor the assurance of pay for his troops could
induce General Moncada to lay down his arms unless ordered to do so by former
Vice President Sacasa. To make matters even worse, Sacasa himself arrived in
Nicaragua early in December to take an active part in the revolt. With him
came additional shipments of Mexican arms. In the meantime, Diaz kept up the
clamor for further assistance from the United States.<50>
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