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Another Major American Intervention
1926 ~ 1927
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President Diaz' first appeal for full-scale American intervention reached
the State Department on 15 November 1926, the day following American
recognition of the new government. Although the Liberals, fed by continuing
shipments of Mexican war materiel, waxed stronger each day, President of the
United States Calvin Coolidge maintained an icy silence. Not until a series
of outrages were committed upon American citizens did his attitude begin to
thaw.
First off, the Liberals, or Constitutionalists as Sacasa called them,
began imposing annoying taxes on American firms. The United States lodged the
customary protest with Diaz and directed its nationals to ignore the Sacasa
government. It was, however, rather difficult to ignore the
Constitutionalists when so many of them had rifles. American businessmen
along the eastern coast of Nicaragua were unable to prevent the rebels from
seizing their supplies and equipment. Finally late in December, an American
citizen employed at Puerto Cabezas (Bragman's Bluff), was killed by a band of
rebels. To serve as a shield against the lawless bands that followed in the
wake of the Constitutionalist army, Marines were landed at Rio Grande,
Bragman's Bluff, and Prinzapolca. At Managua, British and Italian diplomatic
representatives informed the American Minister that their subjects were in
grave danger. 13
Total disregard for American lives and property at last hardened
President Coolidge's heart against the Liberal cause. The President of the
United States, on 10 January 1927, informed Congress that he would do
everything in his power to protect American interests in Nicaragua. The
President based his decision upon the time-honored right of a nation to
protect its nationals residing on foreign soil. Besides employing military
force, Coolidge was to authorize the sale to the Diaz government of 3000 Krag
rifles, 200 Browning machine guns, and 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition.<51>
At the time President Coolidge was addressing Congress, American forces
already were standing guard over the foreigners living in Managua. On 6
January, the Marines and seamen of the GALVESTON's landing party filed ashore
at Corinto to dash over the railroad into the capital.
The strength of American forces in Nicaragua increased. The 2d
Battalion, 5th Marines, arrived at Bluefields on 10 January. After
establishing a neutral zone along the Escondido River, the battalion, less the
51st Company at Rama, sailed from Bluefields through the Panama Canal to
Corinto. On 1 February, at the request of President Diaz, Lieutenant Colonel
James J. Meade's Marines relieved government troops of responsibility for the
defense of Managua.
In spite of the assurance of further American aid, the fortunes of the
Diaz government were taking a turn for the worse. Early in February, the
Liberals captured Chinandega in a bloody house-to-house fight. Government
troops regained the town, but not before the heart of Chinandega had been
burned and blasted to rubble. The Americans rushed food and medical supplies
to the suffering citizens; and on 19 February, a reinforced Marine rifle
company, together with landing parties from three cruisers, left Managua to
post garrison at ruined Chinandega and at undamaged Leon. There, the seamen
kept peace in the city, while the Marines manned an outpost on the edge of
town to guard against the sabotage of a railway bridge.<52>
Throughout February, the Marine Corps continued to pour men and equipment
into Nicaragua. Led by Major Ross E. Rowell, VO-1M landed at Corinto, loaded
its six DeHavilland aircraft on flatcars, and rumbled off to Managua. That
same day, the USS HENDERSON steamed out from Quantico carrying over a thousand
reinforcements for the 5th Regiment. Brigadier General Logan Feland arrived
at Corinto on 7 March to command the 2000 Marines serving in Nicaragua.<53>
Although he approved of armed intervention, President Coolidge had not
neglected the art of diplomacy. Ignoring Diaz' plea for a treaty by which the
United States would guarantee the peace in Nicaragua, he decided to send his
own personal representative, Henry L. Stimson, to the troubled nation.
Stimson's appointment came at a difficult time. Early in March, an
American consular official at Matagalpa had been attacked and severely injured
by unidentified assailants. Within two days, 150 Marines had established a
neutral zone around the town. In the meantime, the Chinese government,
following the example of Belgium and Italy, formally requested that the United
States extend protection to its citizens in Nicaragua. Finally, on 27 March,
the Constitutionalists fired upon one of Major Rowell's aircraft.
As Stimson saw it, elections were the crux of the matter. Only by
insuring a fair count could the endless series of rebellions be brought to a
halt. After arranging for a truce, the American envoy talked with leaders of
both factions. Neither the Constitutionalists nor the Diaz government
objected to American supervision of the 1928 election. Sacasa insisted that
Diaz be replaced by a nonpartisan President until after the election. Since
it was obvious that no such disinterested party existed, the United States
remained adamant in its resolve that Diaz continue in office.
In brief, the Stimson-Diaz plan of reconstruction called for the
surrender of weapons by both sides, a general amnesty, and restoration of
confiscated property. The Liberals would participate in the Diaz cabinet
until the American-supervised election of 1928. In the meantime, while a
Nicaraguan constabulary was being trained, a force of Marines sufficient to
maintain order would be kept in the country. The only feature found
objectionable by Sacasa was the temporary retention of Diaz as President. To
break this stalemate, Stimson decided to confer with General Moncada.
Meeting with Stimson in a neutral zone along the Tipitapa River, the
Constitutionalist general admitted that his victory over the government forces
would not restore order to Nicaragua. Neither party, he went on, could bring
peace to the nation without American aid. For this reason, he did not want to
disrupt the American plan of reconstruction even though he wished to see Diaz
removed at once from the Presidency. When Stimson insisted that Diaz remain
until the election, Moncada yielded. Later, Sacasa agreed to cooperate, and
the crisis seemed ended.<54>
At the time of his departure for the United States, 22 May 1927, Stimson
realized that many Nicaraguans were not satisfied with the settlement. The
ultra-Conservatives felt Diaz had been too soft on their enemies, while some
die-hard Liberals considered Moncada a traitor. The great majority, however,
was overjoyed that the costly war had ended. As Stimson well realized, a
major stumbling block on the road to peace was disarmament. Moncada had
warned the American that he could not possibly control all of the irregular
forces enlisted in the Constitutionalist cause. Together with President Diaz,
Moncada issued an appeal for additional Marines to disarm the rival armies;
and between 17 and 22 May, the 11th Regiment, organized at the time as
infantry, and VO-4M landed at Corinto.<55>
On the surface, all seemed calm. By 26 May, the Liberals had turned in
11,600 rifles, 303 machine guns, and 5,500,000 rounds of ammunition.<56>
Nevertheless, there were plenty of indications of turbulence to come. On 16
May, a band of outlaws, a fragment of the rebel army, raided the village of La
Paz. No sooner had the bandits begun their looting than a detachment of
Marines, led by Captain Richard B. Buchanan, charged along the main street to
meet them. In routing the outlaws, Captain Buchanan and Private Marvin A.
Jackson were killed. Roving bandits and irrational political loyalty could
combine to keep Nicaragua in turmoil for years to come.
Work with a Nicaraguan constabulary was proceeding slowly. Organization
of this important force began on 8 May 1927, when President Diaz requested
that an American officer be assigned to instruct the Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua. Four days later, Colonel Robert Y. Rhea took over as instructor,
and on 24 May, the first recruit took the oath of enlistment. There was,
however, no great rush to the colors. Coffee picking season discouraged men
from volunteering as did the ban on political activity by members of the
Guardia, but the greatest handicap to recruiting was the fact that Nicaraguan
governments seldom paid their private soldiers. In the past, it had been the
custom of officers to keep the money given them to pay their troops. It took
a high degree of salesmanship to convince prospective soldiers that the old
order had indeed passed away. In spite of these difficulties, the Guardia
Nacional was able to order its first company into the field on 1 July 1927.
By the end of the month, the unit was to undergo its baptism of fire at
Ocotal.
Designed as the police force of the legally constituted government of
Nicaragua, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua was entirely distinct from the
Marine Brigade stationed in the country. One division of the Guardia, usually
a company in strength, was to be assigned to each of Nicaragua's political
departments. Two or more key towns might be administered as a subdivision;
and each village of any importance would have its post, a detachment of squad
or platoon size. This was an ambitious program that had to be completed
before the 1928 election. Colonel Rhea and his successor Colonel Elias R.
Beadle toiled toward the day when the Guardia would be able to assume
responsibility for maintaining law and order throughout Nicaragua.<57>
While the Guardia was being organized, an uneasy peace settled over
Nicaragua. The Liberal army disintegrated into small bands difficult to locate
even by aerial reconnaissance. Sometimes a Marine biplane would circle over
one of these groups of renegades, report the location, and perhaps return as a
ground patrol arrived at the scene to disarm the Nicaraguans; but many an
unemployed trooper drifted north toward the Honduran border still clutching
his rifle and bandolier.
Along the northern border of Nicaragua lay the departments of Neuva
Segovia, Esteli, Jinotega, and Cabo Gracias a Dios on the Caribbean coast.
Sparsely populated, given over to coffee plantations, a few mines, and small
farms, these states were the Nicaraguan equivalent of America's Wild West. In
time of peace, law was seldom enforced in this area; in time of revolution,
never. During the recent war, some of the outlaw bands had been incorporated
into Moncada's army, while others had carried on business as usual. In
addition, some of the "generals" dispatched across the border by Sacasa proved adept at pillage as they drifted south to join
Moncada. Now the fighting had ended, but these men were in no mood to
surrender their weapons, their only means of livelihood.
Cabulla, one of the more notorious bandits, erred fatally, when at El
Viejo, on 26 May, he drew a pistol against Captain William P. Richards, one of
the best shots in the Marine Corps; but there were others to carry on in his
stead. Somoto in Neuva Segovia became the haunt of one Salgado, "an
illiterate Indian of very average instincts," fat, barefoot, and nearly fifty.
A onetime laborer on a coffee plantation was Centeno, another bandit
chieftain, who loyally insisted upon operating near his home town of Yali. A
veritable intellectual among the illiterate renegades, Jose Diaz, had wandered
across the border of Nicaragua. This cruel, bull-necked bandit seldom
ventured far to the south.<58>
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