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Operations in the East
1928
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Harassed by aerial attack and under unremitting pressure from ground
patrols, the rebels began drifting eastward from Neuva Segovia. Major Harold
H. Utley, who had assumed command of Marine forces along the east coast of
Nicaragua late in January, had predicted that the enemy would move in his
direction once Chipote had fallen.
Upon assuming command over the Eastern Area, Utley had listened
attentively as 1st Lieutenant Merritt A. Edson unfolded a plan, formulated by
several junior officers, for crushing Sandino and his faithful followers. The
key to the solution of the rebel problem was the Coco River, which meandered
from the highlands around El Chipote to Cape Gracias a' Dios. Why not throw
up a defensive screen across the lower part of the stream and send a strong
patrol upriver into the heart of rebel country? Caught in this pincers
movement, the Sandinistas could either surrender or fall back into Honduras.
Even if they chose the latter course, they would be unable to meddle in the
coming election.
Major Utley was impressed with the idea of a Coco River offensive. The
major difficulty, however, was the terrain. None of the standard maps of
Nicaragua cast much light on the Coco River basin. It was obvious to Utley
that a detailed reconnaissance would be necessary before he could launch his
attack. Edson, recently promoted to Captain, was ordered to take five men
from the Marine detachment, USS DENVER and move upstream to the village of
Huaspuc. How far he should move beyond joint was left to Edson's discretion.
On the morning of 8 March 1928, the patrol chugged westward from Cape
Gracias in the ZAMBITA, a 16-foot, flat bottomed launch powered by a motor
salvaged from a Model T Ford. Edson attempted to force his way beyond
Huaspuc, but reports that Sandino's agents were drumming up recruits as far
downstream as Bocay caused him to change his mind. The patrol returned at
once to Cape Gracias, arriving there on 26 March. As a result of this
reconnaissance, Edson became convinced that a strong force based at Huaspuc
could deny the lower reaches of the river to the rebels.
Early in April, Major Utley began establishing a series of small
garrisons in the Coco watershed near Cape Gracias. Under Captain John A.
Tebbs, the Marine detachment of the USS TULSA was sent up the Bambana River to
reconnoiter the mining district around San Pedro Pis Pis. Edson himself was
assigned the task of blocking the Coco River at Huaspuc. Before these plans could be carried out,
the rebels struck. On 6 April, Utley learned that Marcos Aguerro, driving
down the river toward Cape Gracias, was at Sansang. Edson, 2d Lieutenant
Jesse S. Cook, Jr., and 37 Marines were to move at once to Huaspuc.
Boarding the ancient cruiser GALVESTON at Puerto Cabezas, the patrol
reached the mouth of the Coco shortly before noon of the following day. Most
of the residents of Cape Gracias were reluctant to help the Americans. If the
rebels should slip past the outpost at Huaspuc and seize their city, everyone
who had helped the Americans would suffer.
By evening, Edson had his boats, and the patrol was on its way to
Huaspuc. On 10 April, an outpost was established at Saclin, and four days
later the main body reached Huaspuc. There, he learned of a raid on the gold
mines at San Pedro Pis Pis; but he was powerless to intervene, since there was
no trail leading from Huaspuc to the danger area.
Aerial support of Edson's patrol posed a difficult problem. Aircraft
also were needed in the Northern Area, but planes based there were too far
distant to patrol the Coco basin. Major Rowell's aviators began operating
from Puerto Cabezas late in April, and on the 28th, two Corsairs, flown by
Lieutenants Schilt and Vernon N. Guymon, touched down on a sandbar near the
village of Sansang.
Reinforcements, 20 Marines and 1 Navy pharmacist led by 2d Lieutenant
Milo Carroll, arrived at Huaspuc on 1 May. Most important of all, Carroll had
with him a workable radio. At long last, Edson was able to learn what had
happened since his band started upriver. The Tulsa detachment, reinforced by
members of the 51st Company, had been dispatched inland to protect the mines
at San Pedro Pis Pis. Upon learning that a greatly superior rebel force was
approaching, Captain Tebbs was unable to find a good defensive position and
led his Marines back to Puerto Cabezas.
While Tebbs had been attempting to make contact with them, the rebels had
looted the Neptune and Lone Star Mines at La Luz. At last, Major Utley knew
the location of the enemy. Determined to bottle up and destroy the rebels, he
ordered Tebbs to defend Puerto Cabezas and sent two combat patrols toward the
mines. For Edson, he reserved the task of preventing the raiders from
escaping across the Honduran border.
It was noon of 3 May, when he regained radio contact with Puerto Cabezas,
before Edson learned of his new mission. He was to move at once up the
Huaspuc River to its junction with Kuabul Creek and there wait in ambush for
the retreating bandits. Leaving outposts at Awasbila and Huaspuc, the
captain, 31 Marines, and a pharmacist mate started off toward Kuabul on 4 May.
Early on the morning of 7 May, the Marines arrived at Kuabul. Leaving a
handful of men to guard their boats, they pushed along the Musawas Trail to
Great Falls, where they laid their ambush. After being informed that two
amphibians which had just arrived at Puerto Cabezas soon would be on their way
to contact him, Edson returned to Kuabul to wait for them. Lacking regular
signal panels, the Marines spread their undershirts along a sandbar to point
out the direction from which the enemy was supposed to be approaching. The
flight arrived on schedule, but because the thick jungle screened the twisting
trails from aerial observers, Edson learned nothing from this source.
The rebels apparently had no intention of moving northward. Since a
second Marine patrol, this one led by 1st Lieutenant Donald Tart, was moving
into position athwart the Coco, Edson was free to strike out in search of
Aguerro. Until 20 May, his Marines hacked their way through the jungles
around Musawas village without making contact with the enemy.
In the meantime, Major Utley had ordered three additional patrols into
the interior. The group led by Captain Herbert Rose was to garrison the San
Pedro Pis Pis mines and probe to the southwest along the Matagalpa trail. The
mission assigned the second, under Captain Wesley W. Walker, was to take over
the Huaspuc outpost. Captain Henry D. Linscott, leader of the third, was to
push westward toward Bocay.
According to Utley's plan, Captain Walker's patrol was to deliver
supplies to Edson's group and leave his pack animals there. This much was
accomplished on 20 May, but the second phase of the plan proved more difficult
to execute. Linscott's column, travelling overland, was to hack its way
through the jungle to reach Casa Viejas at about the same time. Such a task,
difficult even for seasoned troops, was impossible for a band of men fresh
from the recruit depot, most of whom had enlisted to become field musics. As
Captain Linscott's men worked their painful way westward, Captain Edson grew
impatient.
Musawa was a pesthole, and the hard-charging Edson did not relish the
idea of becoming a part of its garrison; nor did he want the enemy to escape.
Acting on his own initiative, he pushed his men toward Bocay. It was a rugged
trek. On 28 May, the tired veterans were joined by Captain Linscott's equally
weary recruits. Linecott, now in command of both Edson's DENVER detachment and
his own 60th Company, pushed grimly toward Bocay. He was too late. On 31
May, just one day before the Marines arrived on the scene, the rebel force had
passed through Bocay.
On this first Coco River patrol, no more than four of the enemy were
wounded. The operation nevertheless was a tactical success, for Sandino was
prevented from carrying the war to the east coasts. Deprived of an
opportunity to gain recruits and reap a bountiful harvest in booty, the rebel
general was forced further back into the wilderness.
Sandino was still alive, still able to weave his magic spell over the
peasants of Nicaragua. He had to be broken. While inspecting the garrison at
Puerto Cabezas shortly after the return of the first Coco expedition, General
Logan Feland discussed with Utley and Edson a plan for thrusting upriver to
disperse the enemy concentration at Poteca. Although this new stronghold lay
on the eastern edge of Neuva Segovia, it was protected by impenetrable jungles
from the Marines of the Northern Area. The only avenue of approach was along
the Coco River. Edson, with 2 other officers, 89 enlisted men, and the
promise of air support, embarked on the second Coco patrol.
The patrol was to assemble at Bocay in time to start upstream on 23 July,
but this schedule proved impossible to meet. It was 26 July before the
Marines poled their way westward from Bocay. Instead of 89 men, Edson had but
46 Marines with him. The others, led by Lieutenant Jesse Cook, were to join
him as soon as transportation became available.
For the first five days out of Bocay it rained. The Coco, always a swift
stream, rose 20 feet to become a raging torrent choked with fragments of huts,
logs, and even uprooted trees. The flood temporarily halted Edson, did
serious damage to his patrol, and also delayed Cook's move upriver.
At Mastawas on 4 August, the patrol had its first brush with the enemy.
Two Sandinistas were seen on the outskirts of the village, but both escaped
into the jungle, leaving behind a cache of arms and some letters from various
rebel officers. Again, two days later, the Marines traded shots with a handful
of rebels on the trail two miles beyond Mastawas. No Americans were hit;
however, bloodstains on the underbrush indicated at least one enemy casualty.
Two OL-8 amphibians roared low over the patrol at noon of that same day,
to drop mail and 16 sacks of rations. One of the pilots saw signs of a rebel
camp about two miles up the Coco River, dropped two bombs, and strafed the
area.
Edson pushed cautiously onward with about half his men. The remainder
stayed at the drop zone. Patrols were ordered to hack their way along the
banks, while the main body followed in boats. This maneuver served its
purpose, for the rebel ambush party, was caught completely by surprise when
the Leathernecks came lunging through the underbrush. Edson immediately
landed with the main body and began organizing a skirmish line. Summoned by a
messenger from their position near Ililiquas, the second section was ordered
to move up the right bank, while Edsons was to push along the left. When
darkness was approaching, Edson broke contact and ordered his men back to
Ililiquas.
This action of 6 August was costly to both sides. One Marine was killed
and 3 wounded. The Sandinistas lost ten known killed and at least three
wounded. Worse still from the rebel point of view was the fact that several
chieftains had
behaved miserably under fire. Sandino himself had pulled out his men after
the bombing attack by Marine OL-8's, and the first rebel to run when the
Marines hove into sight had been a colonel.
The second Coco River patrol reached Poteca on 17 August. There had been
another fight on 14 August. This action resulted in sudden death for four
rebels and the capture of Colonel Abram Rivera, chief of Sandino's
transportation service. More important than the taking of the colonel was the
seizure of a cargo of hats, clothing, and shoes, items desperately needed by
the rebels. Edson's men had more than accomplished their mission. Once again
the enemy had been deprived of a base of operations.<82>
During Edson's thrust up the Coco River, the fighting in Neuva Segovia
continued. A major engagement occurred at La Flor on 13-14 May, when a
Marine-Guardia patrol under Captain Robert S. Hunter collided with an
aggressive band of rebels. Apparently neither side was expecting an
encounter. While pushing through a ravine, Captain Hunter's point met a part
of the enemy advance guard. Once this small group had been driven off, the
Marines again pushed forward; but the rebels had gained time to deploy along
the trail.
The enemy opened fire with everything he had. Captain Hunter was
seriously wounded, and command devolved upon 2d Lieutenant Earl S. Piper. The
attackers pulled back before sunset, which enabled the young lieutenant to
establish a perimeter defense.
After dawn of 14 May, Lieutenant Piper sent a patrol to reconnoiter the
positions which the enemy had abandoned. When it encountered no resistance,
he concluded correctly that the rebels had divided their force to block the
trail in either direction from his defensive perimeter. Concern for his
wounded left him no alternative but to try to break through to the south
toward La Flor and Quilali. Piper's route of withdrawal carried him between
two hills, Cinco and Ocho; and here the enemy lay in wait. Forty-five minutes
of bitter fighting followed.
The patrol reached La Flor coffee plantation on 15 May, and established a
strong defensive position. All in all, Piper's men had come through their
ordeal in excellent condition. As soon as reinforcements arrived, they would
be able to move northward once more; but help was slow in coming. Not until
22 May did a column commanded by Major K. M. Rockey arrive at the
plantation.<83>
Momentarily, the Marines had lost the initiative, and the rebels gained a
tactical success. This battle, however, did not force the Americans to relax
the pressure on Sandino. Caught between the forces in Neuva Segovia and
Edson's men in the Coco Valley, Sandino was kept continually on the defensive.
With Sandino temporarily subdued, attention became riveted upon the fast
approaching Nicaraguan general election. Prospects for a fair contest had
never been brighter. From a military standpoint, the rebels had taken a
beating. Although their leader had not lost his old magnetism, the constant
pressure applied by combat patrols could prevent the rebels from disrupting
the election. Holding the Sandinistas in check would not be a simple
task.<84>
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